Does it pay to invest in art? A selection-corrected returns perspective : [draft october 15, 2013]

This paper shows the importance of correcting for sample selection when investing in illiquid assets with endogenous trading. Using a large sample of 20,538 paintings that were sold repeatedly at auction between 1972 and 2010, we find that paintings with higher price appreciation are more likely to trade. This strongly biases estimates of returns. The selection-corrected average annual index return is 6.5 percent, down from 10 percent for traditional uncorrected repeat sales regressions, and Sharpe Ratios drop from 0.24 to 0.04. From a pure financial perspective, passive index investing in paintings is not a viable investment strategy once selection bias is accounted for. Our results have important implications for other illiquid asset classes that trade endogenously

Shareholder liability and bank failure

Does enhanced shareholder liability reduce bank failure? We compare the performance of around 4,200 state-regulated banks of similar size in neighboring U.S. states with different liability regimes during the Great Depression. The distress rate of limited liability banks was 29% higher than that of banks with enhanced liability. Results are robust to a diff-in-diff analysis incorporating nationally-regulated banks (which faced the same regulations everywhere) and are not driven by other differences in state regulations, Fed membership, local characteristics, or differential selection into state-regulated banks. Our results suggest that exposing shareholders to more downside risk can successfully reduce bank failure

How does personal bankruptcy law affect start-ups? *

Abstract We exploit state-level changes in the amount of personal wealth individuals can protect under Chapter 7 personal bankruptcy to analyze the causal effect of debtor protection on the financing structure and performance of a representative panel of U.S start-up firms. We show that a higher level of debtor protection reduces the availability of credit, employment, operating efficiency, and survival rate of firms owned by low-wealth entrepreneurs. We find no such negative effects for firms owned by high-wealth entrepreneurs, who still have large amounts of assets unprotected under the new bankruptcy regime. Our evidence actually indicates that these wealthier entrepreneurs expand their businesses by increasing employment. Our results are consistent with theories that predict that debtor-friendly bankruptcy regimes redistribute credit from the less wealthy to the more wealthy individuals. (JEL: G32, G33, K35, M13

The Net Benefits to Leverage

I estimate the market's valuation of the net benefits to leverage using panel data from 1994 to 2004, identified from market values and betas of a company's debt and equity. The median firm captures net benefits of up to 5.5% of firm value. Small and profitable firms have high optimal leverage ratios, as predicted by theory, but in contrast to existing empirical evidence. Companies are on average slightly underlevered relative to the optimal leverage ratio at refinancing. This result is mainly due to zero leverage firms. I also look at implications for financial policy. Copyright (c) 2010 the American Finance Association.

Does it Pay to Invest in Art? A Selection-corrected Returns Perspective

__Abstract__ This paper shows the importance of correcting for sample selection when investing in illiquid assets with endogenous trading. Using a large sample of 20,538 paintings that were sold repeatedly at auction between 1972 and 2010, we find that paintings with higher price appreciation are more likely to trade. This strongly biases estimates of returns. The selection-corrected average annual index return is 7 percent, down from 11 percent for traditional uncorrected repeat-sales regressions, and Sharpe Ratios drop from 0.4 to 0.1. From a pure financial perspective, passive index investing in paintings is not a viable investment strategy, once selection bias is accounted for. Our results have important implications for other illiquid asset classes that trade endogenously

Agency conflicts and cash: Estimates from a structural model, Working paper

We estimate a dynamic model of firm investment and cash accumulation to ascertain whether agency problems affect corporate cash policy. We model three specific mechanisms that misalign managerial and shareholder incentives: limited managerial ownership of the firm, compensation based on firm size, and managerial perquisite consumption. Our estimates indicate that agency issues related to perquisites are more important for explaining corporate cash balances but that agency issues related to firm size are more important for firm value. We find that firms with lower blockholder and institutional ownership have higher managerial perquisite consumption. We also find that lower managerial ownership is a key factor in the secular upward trend in cash holding. Electronic copy available at